Abstract: Owing to wireless broadcast nature of communication, wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are vulnerable to denial-of-service (DOS) attacks and hole attacks. Preserving security and confidentiality in WSN are crucial, so it is required to design an energy efficient intruder detection system (IDS) to detect and mitigate the attacks. In this paper, an energy efficient intruder detection system based on energy prediction (EE-IDSEP) has been proposed for IEEE 802.15.4-based WSN to detect and mitigate the distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack (i.e., resource depletion attack, power exhaustion attack and flooding) and wormhole attacks. The design of EE-IDSEP consists of optimised watchdog system and hidden Markov model (HMM). The wormhole attack is detected using the optimised watchdog system. The optimised watchdog mechanism is a trust-based method which is used to evaluate the validity of all the nodes of the network. The DDoS attack is detected based on energy consumed using the hidden Markov model. The model of EE-IDS is simulated using NS2 simulator and then it is compared with existing energy efficient trust system (EE-TS) in terms of packet delivery ratio (PDR), packet drop, and energy consumption.
Introduction

IEEE 802.15.4 (Zigbee) WSNs
IEEE 802.15.4 standard depicts the specifications related to the physical layer and the MAC sub layer for the low rate wireless personal area networks (LR-WPAN). A carrier sense multiple access with collision avoidance (CSMA-CA) protocol is provided by this standard which can be used appropriately in the contention access period (CAP). During CAP, all the devices that want to transmit need to use the CSMA-CA mechanism to gain access to a frequency channel. The frequency channel is available equally to all the devices in the same network. The first device that starts using an available channel will keep it to itself until its current transmission is completed. If the device finds the channel busy, its backs off for a random period of time and tries again. This is the most likely mechanism of channel access for the majority of devices in a large network. The low rate and low power wireless personal area networks (LR-WPAN) and sensor networks are the main target of the IEEE 802.15.4 which is basically an extension of the wireless radio and protocol (Jung et al., 2010; Sokullu et al., 2007; Priya and Pradhan, 2008) .
Features of IEEE 802.15.4 wireless sensor network (WSN):
• dependable data transfer
• simple installation
• multi-year battery lifetime
• highly reduced cost
• simple protocol stack.
Some of the appliances aided by the Zigbee are home automation processes, healthcare systems, remote control and monitoring devices, etc. (David et al., 2010; Zheng et al., 2006) .
Attack detection in Zigbee sensor networks
One of the main constraints in implementing security features in a zigbeee wireless network is limited resources. The nodes are mainly battery powered and have limited computational power and memory size. Zigbee is targeted for low-cost applications and the hardware in the nodes might not be tamper resistant. If an intruder acquires a node from an operating network that has no tamper resistance, the actual key could be obtained simply from the device memory. A tamper-resistant node can erase the sensitive information, including the security keys, if tampering is detected.
Types of attacks:
• hole attacks (worm hole, sinkhole, etc.)
• passive listening attack.
Among the existing attacks in WSN, denial-of-service (DOS) and whole attacks are most common malicious attacks and cannot defend easily. The presence of multiple DOS attacks in the network may leads to DDOS attacks, which may causes diminish the network's capacity to perform its function, resource exhaustion, power exhaustion, jamming, and flooding, etc. Hence, to improve the network performance, it is required to introduce an energy efficient intrusion detection system (IDS) to detect DDoS attacks and hole attacks. Therefore, in this paper, we take into account the DDOS such as resource depletion attack, power exhaustion and flooding attacks in physical and data link layer, wormhole attack in network layer is considered.
Intrusion detection system
A system which is capable of identifying the malicious nodes and then quickly informs neighbouring nodes to perform proper countermeasures is called as the IDS. The main disadvantage of the IDS is the limited computational and storage resource. The major issue faced by the IDS is the increased rate of false alarm that is created due to the expansion. Since the network size is bigger, the amount of data being generated is also huge, which makes real-time prediction a difficult task (Rassam et al., 2013) . The IDS schemes must utilise lower amount of energy and attain good performance level because in WSN, energy efficiency is a very important criteria.
In WSN, watchdog is a malicious node detection mechanism by observing the behaviour of the node in the network (Forootaninia and Ghaznavi-Ghoushchi, 2012) . In WSN safety, watchdog is a basic part of the trust processes. However, the energy consumed by the watchdog is very high and therefore reduces its lifetime in the network (Zhou et al., 2015) The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the literature review and Section 3 gives the proposed IDS for detection of DDoS attacks and wormhole attack using optimised watchdog system. Section 4 discusses about the simulation result and finally, Section 5 concludes the paper based on findings and analysis. Balarengadurai and Saraswathi (2013) have proposed a detection and prediction technique against DDoS attacks in IEEE 802.15.4 based on the fuzzy logic system. The DDoS attack is detected based on the energy consumed by the node, which is estimated using the fuzzy-based detection and prediction system (FBDPS). Ahmed et al. (2014) have presented a secured cross-layer, energy efficient MAC protocol (CL-MAC) dedicated to delay sensitive WSNs for detecting and avoiding wormhole attack. David et al. (2010) have presented a Bayesian trust model developed to identify MAC layer attacks by introducing some parameters which are context-dependent along with a flexible ageing factor which lets the adaptive handling of this trust model by varying particular network conditions on the basis of some context parameters. This proposed trust model can be accordingly adapted and applied in different protocols and networks. Wood et al. (2007) have proposed defeating energy-efficient jamming (DEEJAM), a new MAC-layer protocol for identifying the hidden jammers with IEEE 802.15.4-based hardware. It uses four techniques to protect the data transmission from the attacking jammer, escape its attack and minimise its effect. This protocol effectively overcomes many complicated and dangerous attacks such as interrupt jamming, activity jamming, scan jamming, and pulse jamming.
Literature review
Among the existing works based on watchdog, Cho et al. (2012) discuss the security vulnerabilities of some of the watchdog and trust mechanisms and counter measures.
Forootaninia and Ghaznavi-Ghoushchi (2012) have presented an advanced watchdog mechanism for identifying the malicious nodes on the basis of a power aware hierarchical model. In this mechanism, the cluster head takes up the role of the watchdog. This mechanism faces the issue of storage overhead and buffer overflow because every message has to be managed by the cluster head. Zhou et al. (2015) have presented a collection of optimisation techniques to reduce the energy cost of watchdog utilisation, when maintaining the security of the network at appropriate level. It includes the theoretical analyses along with the practical algorithms which are capable of scheduling the several tasks of the watchdog based on the position of the node and also the trustworthiness of the destination nodes.
Detection of DDoS attacks and worm hole attacks using optimised watchdog system
Overview
In this work, the optimised watchdog trust system (Zhou et al., 2015) have been extended for detecting the DDoS attacks and worm hole attacks. A topology discovery phase is conducted by the sink node such that the routing path from each node to the sink is stored in the respective nodes. The worm hole attack detection is based on the abnormal variation in the end to end delay and packet delivery ratio (PDR). Here, each watchdog node estimates the trustworthiness of node by collecting the hop by hop queuing delay and received traffic. The DDoS attack includes resource depletion attack, battery exhaustion attack, etc. For this, energy dissipation rate of sensors is predicted by applying the hidden Markov model (HMM). The watchdogs collect the residual energies from the monitored nodes. It estimates the actual energy consumed from the reported residual energies and compares them with predicted energy values. The nodes with abnormal energy consumption are regarded to be malicious. Figure 1 illustrates the block diagram of the proposed system.
Detection of the wormhole attack 3.2.1 Wormhole attack
Wormhole attack is an attack usually occurred in the routing protocols of WSN. In this attack, the attacking nodes develop an illusion that two nodes at different ends of the network are linked through few nodes which are neighbours. But in reality, the linking nodes which look like neighbours are actually not neighbours and are situated far away from each other. The virtual link is created by connecting the supposed neighbours by means of a concealed channel. As a result, in this attack, the malicious nodes can attack from two spots which lie at two different ends. Since, the distant nodes appear to be connected through few intermediate neighbouring nodes, the traffic through this path increases at a higher rate. The attacker takes advantage of this situation and degrades the network performance drastically (Natu and Sethi, 2007) . Figure 2 describes the wormhole attack where nodes 1, 2, 4 and 9 are malicious nodes and attack the network. Nodes 4 and 9 advertises that they are neighbours and transmit the data through a short path when in reality the path followed is through nodes 3, 4, 6, 8, 9 and 10.
Topology discovery mechanism
Step 1 The sink periodically broadcasts a topology message to all the nodes in the network.
Step 2 By receiving the topology message, every node measures QoS metrics such as the queue delay (QD) and residual energy (ER) of its neighbour nodes.
Step 3 After the measurement of QoS metrics, each node gathers information about other nodes and stores in a topology information table (TIT) as shown in Table 1 . Thus, TIT holds the source node ID, 1-hop and 2-hop neighbour node ID, ER, QD of each node along with the 2-hop neighbourhood information.
Step 4 The TIT value is broadcast again towards the sink by the nodes and utilising the updated node information; the topology is discovered by the sink. 
Optimised location of watchdog nodes
The watchdog technique is a trust-based intrusion detection technique which identifies the malicious nodes and its activities in the network by monitoring the nodes within its communication range. The nodes selected as the watchdog node are the most trustworthy nodes due to its inherent features like highly stable. These watchdog nodes are deployed in the network randomly just as any other node. When any node transmits its data packet towards its destination node through the intermediate nodes, the watchdog present within the communication range of the transmitting node and also the intermediate node, can determine if the data packet is being transmitted by the intermediate node, thus checking the validity of the nodes involved in the transmission of the data packet. This is due to the fact that, when the source node forwards it packet to the desired intermediate node, along with this desired node, many other surrounding nodes within the communication range of the sending node receives this data packet. All the nodes which are not desired intermediate nodes that will simply drop the data packet. But, when the watchdog node receives this data packet, it utilises this packet for intrusion detection. Figure 3 , where n i ∈ N represents a sensor node in WSN and e ij ∈ E means that the nodes n i and n j are neighbourhood (i.e., which are exist within each other's communication range). Let r i be the communication range of n i , and e ij ∈ E exists only if d ij ≤ r i and d ij ≤ r j . Let B i = {n j | e ij ∈ N} = {n j | d ij ≤ r i and d ij ≤ r j }, B i ∈ N is defined as the set of n i 's neighbourhood nodes. Although n 3 and n 4 are exist within n 2 's communication range (i.e., d 23 ≤ r 2 and d 24 ≤ r 2 ), e 23 and e 24 do not exist (i.e., n 3 , n 4 ∉ B 2 ) because d 23 > r 3 and d 24 > r 4 .
Watchdog techniques are optimised to minimise the energy cost of the entire WSN and to maximise security in terms of trust accuracy and trust robustness. To achieve optimisation, an appropriate set of cooperative watchdog nodes (W j ) must be found. This problem is to select the nodes from each target nodes' neighbour to perform watchdog task and to schedule watchdog tasks among those selected watchdog nodes. Let n i and n j be the nodes within the communication range and d ij be the spatial distance between n i and n j . The node n i can work as a watchdog to monitor only ∀n j ∈ B i , and vice versa, only ∀n j ∈ B i can perform watchdog tasks to monitor n i . The nodes that are located close to the optimal d ij must be selected as watchdog nodes. Hence, the problem of finding optimal W j can be transformed to the problem of finding optimal d ij . The node n i with less d ij will consume less energy compared to the nodes that are located farther apart. When the attacker nodes are treated as watchdogs, then the security goal is not attained. Hence, the optimal watchdog location d ij can be determined by considering the overall risk, which considers both security and energy.
Wormhole attack detection
In the detection of the wormhole attack, a combination of the active and passive detection technique is applied. In the passive technique, additional data traffic is not added into the network and attack is detected on the basis of the abnormalities detected by the passive monitors. In the active technique, regular probe traffic is transmitted into the network to gather the end to end network details and then the network validity is decided accordingly.
Two main factors are considered during the detection of the attack. They are the abnormal variation in the end to end delay and PDR. The most stable node in the network is selected as the watchdog. The hop by hop queuing delay is the delay experienced by a data packet at each node as it waits for its turn, to be transmitted to the next node along the path to its destination. 
The wormhole detection technique can be described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1
Notations
• D: end to end delay
• PDR: packet delivery ratio
• SD: standard deviation
• TD: topology discovery 2 Each node transmits probes to its 3 hop neighbours and records the average D, estimates the PDR along the path between the 3 hop nodes.
9 If there is a huge difference between the compared values which is basically an abnormal deviation in the D or PDR value, then it indicates the wormhole attack in the network.
Detection of the DDoS attack
The malicious nodes have to use additional energy to launch DDoS attacks (Balarengadurai and Saraswathi, 2013) . Therefore, we propose to predict the energy consumption at various states of sensor node, to predict the malicious nodes. For this, energy dissipation rate of sensors is predicted by applying the HMM.
Energy estimation using HMM
The HMM is an extension of the conventional Markov model. In HMM, the Markov process is not visible, i.e., it is hidden and only the final result of the process can be seen.
Only the final state is observable in HMM. There exist different states in HMM like the initial state, transition state and observed state. Every state has a probability distribution on the different possible outcomes. The sequence followed by the process is hidden but not the result, i.e., observed state. HMM includes the set of hidden states S and set of observation states V. The basic picturisation of HMM is shown below in Figure 4 . The set of hidden and observation states are represented below in equations (3) and (4) respectively.
( )
Let Q be the state sequence of fixed length L, to corresponding observations O,
HMM is generally formulated as,
In the equation (7), A denotes the transition array, which is independent of time t and keeps track of probability of interference state j following interference state i and indicated as below,
A a a P q s q s Whereas, array of observation is represented by B and it is independent of time t. It stores the probability of observation k, which is produced from the state j. The observation array B is detailed in equation (9) [ ] ( )
π signifies the initial state probability as shown below,
In this paper, the observation states correspond to the various states of a power consumed during various states of a sensor node, namely, TRANSMIT, RECEIVE, PROCESS and IDLE. (i.e.) where TxP, RxP, PrP and IP denotes transmit power, receive power, processing power and idle power, respectively at n time intervals. The output (hidden state) will be the cumulative energy dissipation rate of the corresponding nodes over the n time intervals.
DDoS attack detection algorithm
The detection of the DDoS attack is based on the HMM scheme for the estimation of the energy consumption. The detection of the DDoS attack is described in algorithm (Ahmed et al., 2014) .
Algorithm 2
Notations:
• E consumed : estimated energy dissipation rate of various states using HMM.
• E collected_residual : collected ER from the monitored nodes.
• E calculated_residual : estimated ER based on E consumed .
1 Watchdog node estimates E consumed using HMM filter as described in Section 3.3.1.
2 The watchdog also collects the ER (E collected_residual ) from all the monitored nodes.
3 Watchdog estimates the difference between the initial energy and E consumed , to calculate the E calculated_residual .
4 Then the watchdog compares the calculated ER (E calculated_residual ) with the E collected_residual .
5 If E collected_residual = E calculated_residual , then energy consumed is normal a If E collected_residual ≠ E calculated_residual , then energy consumed is abnormal.
6 If there is a huge difference during comparison, this indicates abnormal consumption of energy by the node.
7 If the huge difference in the energy consumption level depicted by the watchdog and according to the HMM technique matches. Then, this indicates that the node is malicious and the occurrence of the DDoS attack.
Thus, the DDoS attack is efficiently detected in the network. Finally, attack node will be deleted from the network.
Simulation results
Simulation parameters
NS2 simulator is used to simulate the proposed and existing system. IEEE 802.15.4 is used as the MAC layer protocol. In the simulation, the attacker is varied as 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. The simulation settings and parameters are summarised in Table 2 . 
Performance metrics
We evaluate performance of the new protocol mainly according to the following parameters. We compare the energy efficient trust system (EE-TS) through watchdog optimisation (Zhou et al., 2015) technique with our proposed energy efficient intruder detection system based on energy prediction (EE-IDSEP).
• Average PDR: It is the ratio of the number of packets received successfully and the total number of packets transmitted.
• Average end-to-end delay: The end-to-end-delay is averaged over all surviving data packets from the sources to the destinations.
• Packet drop: It is the number of packets dropped during the data transmission.
• Energy consumption: It is the average energy consumption of all the nodes in the network.
Results and analysis
The descriptions of simulated results are presented in this section.
Based on DDoS attackers
Figures 5 to 7 show the variation of delivery ratio, packet drop and energy consumption by varying the attacker from 1 to 5 for the Poisson traffic in EE-IDSEP and EE-TS. It is inferred from the results that EE-IDSEP outperforms EE-TS by 8% in terms of delivery ratio, 19% in terms of packet drop and 4% in terms of energy consumption. 
Based on wormhole attackers
Figures 8 to 11 show the results of delivery ratio, packet drop and energy consumption by varying the attacker from 1 to 5 for the Poisson traffic in EE-IDSEP and EE-TS. It is inferred from the result that EE-IDSEP outperforms and EE-TS by 20% in terms of delivery ratio, 21% in terms of packet drop, 7% in terms of energy consumption and 54% in terms of packets received. 
Conclusions
In this paper, the EE-IDSEP using optimised watchdog system with HMM technique has been proposed for detecting the two specific attacks: wormhole attack and the DDoS attack in the Zigbee network. Initially, the detection of the wormhole attack is considered. This detection is based on the delay and PDR involved during the data transmission in the network. This attack can be predicted by increased value of delay and PDR abnormally during the wormhole attack. This prediction is validated based on the watchdog mechanism. The DDoS attack is detected based on the specific feature of the DDoS attack: huge consumption of energy. So, based on the energy consumed by the nodes in the network and through the HMM technique, the attack is detected. It is proved through the simulation result that EE-IDSEP has better performance than the EE-TS in terms of PDR, packets drop and energy consumption.
